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Abstract
Autonomic communication and computing is the new paradigm for dynamic service integra-
tion over a network. An autonomic network crosses organizational and management boundaries
and is provided by entities that see each other just as partners that need to collaborate with
little known or even unknown parties. Policy-based network access and management already
requires a paradigm shift in the access control mechanism: from identity-based access control
to trust management and negotiation, but even this is not enough for cross-organizational auto-
nomic communication. For many services no autonomic partner may guess a priori what will be
sent by clients and clients may not know a priori what credentials are demanded for completing
a service, which may require the orchestration of many diﬀerent autonomic nodes.
To solve this problem we propose to use interactive access control: servers should be able to
get back to clients asking for missing or excessing credentials, whereas the latter may decide to
supply or decline requested credentials and so on until a ﬁnal decision is taken.
This proposal is grounded in a formal model on policy-based access control. It identiﬁes the
formal reasoning services of deduction, abduction and consistency checking that characterize the
problem. It proposes two access control algorithms for stateless and stateful autonomic services
and shows their completeness and correctness.
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1 Introduction
Recent advances of Internet technologies and globalization of peer-to-peer communications oﬀer
for organizations and individuals an open environment for rapid and dynamic resource integration.
In such an environment federations of heterogeneous systems are formed with no central authority
and no uniﬁed security infrastructure. Considering this level of openness each server is responsible
for the management and enforcement of its own security policies with a high degree of autonomy.
Controlling access to services is a key aspect of networking and the last few years have seen
the domination of policy-based access control. Indeed, the paradigm is broader than simple access
control and one may speak of policy-based network self-management (See [36, 30] or the IEEE
Policy Workshop series for examples). The intuition is that actions of nodes controlling access to
services are automatically derived from policies. The nodes look at events, requests and credentials
presented to them, evaluate the rules of their policies according those new facts and derive the
actions [36, 37]. Policies can be “simple” iptables conﬁguration rules for Linux ﬁrewalls1 or
complex logical policies expressed in languages such as Ponder [7] or a combination of policies
across heterogeneous systems as in OASIS XACML framework [40].
Dynamic coalitions and autonomic communication add new challenges: a truly autonomic net-
work is born when nodes are no longer within the boundary of a single enterprise, which could
deploy its policies on each and every node and guarantee interoperability. An autonomic net-
work is characterized by properties of self-awareness, self-management and self-conﬁguration of its
constituent nodes. In an autonomic network, nodes are partners that oﬀer services and lightly
integrate their eﬀorts into one (hopefully coherent) network. This cross enterprise scenario poses
novel security challenges with aspects of both trust management systems and workﬂow security.
From trust management systems [38, 10, 27] it takes the credential-based view. Since access to
network services is oﬀered by autonomic nodes on their own to potentially unknown clients, the
decision to grant or deny access can only be made on the basis of the credentials sent by the client.
In contrast with trust management systems, we have a continuous process and thus a notion of
assignment of permissions to credentials must look beyond a single access decision.
From workﬂow access control systems (see e.g. [2, 4, 13, 17]) we borrow all classical problems
such as dynamic assignment of roles to users, dynamic separation of duties, and assignment of
permissions to users according to the least privilege principles. In contrast with workﬂow security
management schemes, we can no longer assume that an enterprise will assign tasks and roles to users
(its employees) in such a way that makes the overall ﬂow possible w.r.t. its security constraints.
The reason is that the enterprise itself no longer exists.
In an autonomic communication scenario a client might have all the necessary credentials to
access a service but may simply not know it. Equally, it is unrealistic to assume that servers will
publish their security policies on the web so that a client can do a policy combination and evaluation
itself. So, it should be possible for a server to ask a client, on the ﬂy, for additional credentials
and the client may disclose or decline to provide them. Then the server can re-evaluate the client’s
request, considering the newly submitted credentials, and iterate the process until a ﬁnal decision
(of grant or deny) is taken. We call this modality interactive access control.
Part of these challenges can be solved by using policy-based self-management of networks but
not all of them. Indeed, if we abstract away the details of the policy implementation, we can observe
that the only reasoning service that is actually used by policy-based self-management approaches
1See http://www.netfilter.org/.
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is deduction: given a policy and a set of additional facts ﬁnd out all consequences (actions or
obligations) of the policy and the facts. We simply look whether granting the request can be
deduced from the policy and the current facts. Policies can be diﬀerent [3, 27, 5, 4] but the kernel
reasoning service is the same.
1.1 Innovation of the Framework
Access Control for autonomic communication needs another reasoning service: abduction [35].
Loosely speaking, we could say that abduction is deduction in reverse: given a policy and a request
to access a network service, we want to know what credentials/events would grant access. Logically
speaking, we want to know whether there is a (possibly minimal) set of facts that could be added
to the policy so that the request can be deduced from it.
If we look again at our intuitive description of interactive access control, it is immediate to realize
that abduction is the core service needed by policy-based autonomic servers. Indeed, we might even
want the same service to run on both client and server sides whenever the client also requires some
evidence from the server in order to establish trust before disclosing his own credentials.
Here, we present a framework for reasoning about interactive access control for autonomic
communication that answers these challenges and that is grounded in a formal theory by using
logic-based policies.
The intuition behind an interactive access control algorithm is the following.
• Initially a client submits a set of credentials and a service request.
• Then the algorithm checks whether the request is granted by the access policy according to
the client’s set of credentials.
• If the check fails then the algorithm computes all credentials disclosable from the disclosure
policy according to the presented credentials.
• After that, using abductive reasoning, the algorithm ﬁnds a (minimal) solution set of missing
credentials that unlocks the desired resource and preserves the access policy consistent.
• If such a set cannot be found, the algorithm performs a recovery step in which it runs the
abductive reasoning again to ﬁnd a (minimal) set of excessing credentials that ban the client
to get a solution for the resource.
• Once a solution (missing or excessing credentials) is found it is communicated back to the
client so that he can provide the missing credentials and revoked the excessing ones.
This basic procedure needs to be enhanced if we consider stateful access policies which are essentially
non-monotone. For example, if a client can only access a service 3 times, clearly, presenting the
same set of credentials together with the information that this is the fourth time would not lead to
a grant decision. Separation of duties might be an additional reason for non-monotonicity.
In contrast to intra-enterprise workﬂow systems [4], a partner oﬀering services has no way to
assign to a client the right set of credentials which would be consisted with his future requests
(because the partner cannot assign to or prohibit the client future tasks). So, we must have some
roll-back procedure by which, if the user has by chance sent the “wrong” credentials, he can revoke
them.
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2 A Motivating Example
Let us assume that we have a Planet-Lab shared network between the University of Trento and
Fraunhofer institute in Berlin in the context of the E-NEXT network. For the sake of simplicity
let us also assume that there are three main access types to resources: disk – read access to data
residing on the Planet-Lab machines; run – execute access to data and possibility to run processes
on the machines; and conﬁgure – including the previous two types of accesses plus the possibility
of conﬁguring network services on the machines.
We also suppose that all Planet-Lab credentials (certiﬁcates) are signed and issued by trusted
authorities and that the validation of these credentials is performed before the actual access control
process. This can be done by plugging in any standard Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI).
Deﬁning the access policy, Fraunhofer institute and University of Trento decide to allow:
– disk access to Planet-Lab resources to anybody (any request coming) from the two institu-
tions,
– run access to the network content to any member of the Planet-Lab joint hierarchy model
(shown later on in Figure 2) or, if not a member, the request should come from dedicated for
that internal machines of the institutions,
– configure access to anybody that has run access to the network resources and is at mini-
mum researcher at University of Trento or junior researcher at Fraunhofer institute. Further
extending access rights, configure access is also granted to associate professors or senior
researchers with the lightened requirement of accessing the Planet-Lab network from the
respective country domain of Italy or Germany. The least restrictive access is granted to
full professors or members of board of directors obliging them to provide the appropriate
credential for that.
Now, examine the case in which a senior researcher at Fraunhofer institute wants to have access
to the system from his home place (deciding to work at home) presenting its employee certiﬁcate
assuming that it is potentially enough to get read access to certain documents. But, according to
the policy rules the system should deny the request because disk, run or configure access requests
coming from domains diﬀerent than University of Trento or Fraunhofer institute are allowed only
to associate professors or senior researchers or higher role-positions.
So, the natural question is, ”is it always the behavior we want from the system?” Shall we
leave him harassing from being idle for the whole day simply because he did not know or just has
forgotten that access to the system outside Fraunhofer needs another certiﬁcate?
The full formalization of the example we shall see later in §7.
3 The Basic Framework
Using Datalog and logic programs for representing and reasoning about access control is customary
in computer security [3, 27, 5, 4] and this work is no exception. Our formal model for reasoning
about access control is based on variants of Datalog with the stable model semantics and combines
in a novel way a number of features:
• logic for trust management by Li et al. [27];
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• logic for workﬂow access control by Bertino et al. [4];
• logic for disclosure and access control by Bonatti and Samarati [5];
• some ideas from trust negotiation by Yu, Winslett and Seamons [42].
We consider the view of a single partner since we cannot assume sharing of policies between
partners.
In our framework each partner has a security policy for access control PA and a security policy
for disclosure control PD. The policy for access control is used for making decision about usage of
all web services oﬀered by a partner. The policy for disclosure control is used to decide credentials
whose need can be potentially disclosed to a client. In other words, PA protects partner’s resources
by stipulating what credentials a requestor must satisfy to be authorized for a particular resource
while, in contrast, PD deﬁnes which credentials among those occurring in PA are disclosable so, if
needed, can be demanded from the requestor.
We also keep a set of active credentials CP that have been presented by the client in past
interactions within the same service session and a set of declined credentials CN also compiled from
the client’s past interactions. So, to execute a service in the fragment of a partner a user will submit
a set of presented credentials Cp and a service request r. In the same context, CN is computed as
a diﬀerence between the missing credentials CM, the client was asked in the last interaction, and
the credentials presented in the current step, namely CN = CM \ Cp.
4 Syntax
For the syntax we build upon [4, 5, 27]. We have three disjoint sets of constants: one for users
identiﬁers denoted by User :U ; one for roles denoted by Role :R; and one for services denoted by
Service :S.
The predicates can be divided into three classes: predicates for assignments of users to roles
and services (Fig. 1a), predicates for credentials (Fig. 1b), and predicates describing the current
status of the system (Fig. 1c). The last class of predicates keeps track on the main activities done
by users and services, such as: a predicate specifying successful activation of services by users;
a predicate for successful completion of services; its dual one for abortion; predicates indicating
granting a service to a user and, the opposite one, denial user’s access to a service.
Furthermore, for some additional workﬂow constraints we need to have some meta-level predi-
cates that specify how many statements are true. We use here a notation borrowed from Niemela¨ smod-
els system, but we are substantially using the count predicates deﬁned by Das [8]:
n ≤ {X.Pr} where n is a positive integer, X is a set of variables, and Pr is a predicate, so that
intuitively n ≤ {X.Pr} is true in a model if at least n instances of the grounding of X
variables in Pr are satisﬁed by the model. The {X.Pr} ≤ n is the dual predicate.
We assume additional comparison predicates (for instance for equality or inequalities) or some
additional monadic predicates for instance to qualify services or users.
We note here that the model, presented in the this section, can be adapted to any generic policy
framework. The information we need from the underlying policy model is shown in Figure 1(a, b)
and that information can be found in (extracted from) most policy languages.
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Role :Ri  Role :Rj when role Role :Ri dominates role Role :Rj .
Role :Ri Service:S Role :Rj when for service Service :S, role Role :Ri dominates role Role :Rj .
assign (P, Service :S) when access to Service :S is granted to P . P can be either a Role :R or User :U .
(a) Predicates for assignments to Roles and Services
declaration (User :U) it is a statement by the User :U for its identity.
credential (User :U,Role :R) when User :U has a credential activating Role :R.
credentialTask (User :U, Service :S) when User :U has the right to access Service :S.
(b) Predicates for Credentials
running (P, Service :S,Number :N ) when the N th activation of service S is executed by P .
abort (P, Service :S,Number :N) if the N th activation of service S within a workﬂow aborts.
success (P, Service :S,Number :N) if the N th activation of service S within a workﬂow successfully executes.
grant (P, Service :S,Number :N) if the N th request of service S has been granted
deny (P, Service :S,Number :N) if the N th request of service S has been denied.
(c) Predicates describing the current status of services
Figure 1: Predicates Used in the Model
Policies are written as normal logic programs [1]. These are sets of rules of the form:
A ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (1)
where A, Bi and Ci are (possibly ground) predicates among those described in §4. A is called the
head of the rule, each Bi is called a positive literal and each not Cj is a negative literal, whereas
the conjunction of the Bi and not Cj is called the body of the rule. If the body is empty the rule
is called a fact. A normal logic program is a set of rules.
In our framework, we also need constraints that are rules with an empty head.
← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm (2)
5 Semantics
One of the most prominent semantics for normal logic programs is the stable model semantics
proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [12] (see also [1] for an introduction). The intuition is to
interpret the rules of a program P as constraints on a solution set S (a set of ground atoms) for
the program itself. So, if S is a set of atoms, rule (1) is a constraint on S stating that if all Bi are
in S and none of Cj are in it, then A must be in S. A constraint (2) is used to rule out from the
set of acceptable models situations in which Bi are true and all Cj are false (are not acceptable).
We now consider ground rules, i.e. rules where atoms do not contain variables.
Deﬁnition 5.1 The reduct PS of a ground logic program P with respect to a set of atoms S is
the deﬁnite program obtained from P by deleting:
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1. each rule that has a negative literal not C in its body with C ∈ S;
2. each negative literal in the bodies of the remaining rules.
The reduct PS is a deﬁnite logic program. Let M(PS) = MPS be the semantics of the deﬁnite
logic program PS , i.e. its minimal model.
Deﬁnition 5.2 A set of atoms S is a stable model of a normal logic program P iﬀ S = M(PS).
A program can have none, one or many stable models. The deﬁnition of stable models captures
the two key properties of solution sets of logic programs.
1. Stable models are minimal: a proper subset of a stable model is not a stable model.
2. Stable models are grounded: each atom in a stable model has a justiﬁcation in terms of the
program, i.e. it is derivable from the reduct of the program with respect to the model.
Though this deﬁnition of stable models in terms of ﬁx points is non-constructive there are
constructive deﬁnitions [1] and systems [31, 26] that can cope with ground programs having tens
of thousands of rules.
Logic programs with variables can be given semantics in terms of stable models.
Deﬁnition 5.3 The stable models of a normal logic program P with variables are those of its
ground instantiation PH with respect to its Herbrand universe2.
If logic programs are function free, then an upper bound on the number of instantiations is rcv,
where r is the number of rules, c the number of the constants, and v the upper bound on the
number of distinct variables in each rule.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Logical Consequence and Consistency) Let P be a logic program and L be
a (positive or negative) ground literal. L is a logical consequence of P (P |= L) if L is true in
every stable model of P . P is consistent (P |= ⊥) if there is a stable model for P .
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Security Consequence) A request r is a security consequence of a policy P if
(i) P is logically consistent and (ii) r is a logical consequence of P .
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Abduction) Let P be a logic program, H a set of predicates (called hypothesis,
or abducibles), L a (positive or negative) ground literal, and ≺ a partial order (p.o.) over subsets
of H. A solution of the abduction problem is a set of ground atoms E such that
(i) E ⊆ H,
(ii) P ∪ E |= L,
(iii) P ∪ E |= ⊥,
(iv) any set E′ ≺ E does not satisfy all conditions above.
Traditional p.o.s are subset containment or set cardinality. Other solutions are possible with or-
derings over predicates.
2Essentially, we take all constants and functions appearing in the program and combine them in all possible ways.
This yields the Herbrand universe. Those terms are then used to replace variables in all possible ways thus building
its ground instantiation.
8
6 Logical Model
In this section we give formal deﬁnitions of the security policies introduced informally in §3.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Access Policy) An access control policy PA is a logic program over the predi-
cates deﬁned in §4 in which
(i) no credential and no execution atom can occur in the head of a rule,
(ii) role hierarchy atoms occur as facts,
An access request r is a ground instance of an assign (User :U,Service :S) predicate.
In contrast to the proposal by Bertino et al. [4] for workﬂows, we don’t need any special rule for
determining which services cannot be executed and which services must be executed by a speciﬁc
user or role. Logic constraints guarantee the same result.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Disclosure Policy) A disclosure policy PD is a logic program in which no role
hierarchy atom and no execution atom can occur in the head of a rule.
Example 1 (Policy Constraints) Consider a security policy in which having a credential for the
role accountant is incompatible with the assignment of any role manager, and that the execution of
a service phoneCall from user billG requires that the service answer must be executed by anybody
having the role headOfStaff . The following rules guarantees the desired behavior:
← credential (User :U,Role :accountant), assign (User :U,Role :manager).
assign (Role :headOfStaff,Service :answer)←
running (User :billG,Service :call,Number :N).
Example 2 (Access Policy and Separation of Duty Constraints) Consider an e-stock
portal where we have roles associated to services as follows: role eSeller – for selling shares and
bonds on the ﬂoor; role eBuyer – for buying shares and bonds; role eAdvisor – used by accredited
consultants to sell their advice to other customers of the portal. Then examine the case where one
could send the eAdvisor credential to the service publishing advisories and suggest to sell shares,
and at the same time the eBuyer credential to the service hosting bids.
In such situations we can deﬁne separation of duty rules:
customer(eSeller)←.
customer(eBuyer)←.
←assign (User :U,Role :R1), customer(R1), assign (User :U,Role :eAdvisor).
The access control rule on reviewing selling bids is the following:
assign (User :U,Service :S) ← credential (User :U,Role :R),
assign (Role :R,Service :S).
assign (Role :R,Service :reviewSell) ← Role :R  Role :eSeller.
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As mentioned, we will use the disclosure policy PD to decide which missing credentials are to be
asked from the client.
Example 3 (Disclosure Policy) Considering again the access policy in Example 2. A possible
(part of) the disclosure policy PD could be:
credential (User :U,Role :eUser)←declaration (User :U).
credential (User :U,Role :eSeller)←credential (User :U,Role :eUser).
credential (User :U,Role :eSellerV IP )←credential (User :U,Role :eSeller).
The second rule says: to reveal the need for a eSeller credential there should be already a credential
attesting the client as a valid user (Role :eUser) of the system.
So, the request assign (User :fm,Service :reviewSell) together with
credential (User :fm,Role :eUser) and declaration (User :fm) will yield a counter request
credential (User :fm,Role :eSeller) specifying the need for additional privileges necessitated to get
the service.
Note that the need for a credential attesting the role eSellerVIP, disclosed together with eSeller,
should not be considered as a potential output by the system because the ”intuition” says that
eSeller is enough.
Remark 1 (Notion of Minimality) The choice of the partial order has a major impact in pres-
ence of complex role hierarchies. The ”intuitive” behavior of the abduction algorithm for the extrac-
tion of the minimal set of security credentials is not guaranteed by the straightforward interpretation
of H (abducibles) as the set of credentials and by the set cardinality or set containment orderings.
Consider the following program:
Role :r2  Role :r1 ← .
assign (User :U,Service :ws) ← credential (User :U,Role :R),Role :R  Role :r1.
Request assign (User :fm,Service :ws) has two ⊆-minimal solutions:
{credential (User :fm,Role :r1)} , {credential (User :fm,Role :r2)}
Yet, our intuition is that the ﬁrst should be the minimal one.
So, we need a more sophisticated partial order rather than set cardinality or set containment.
For example, we could stipulate that E 
 E′ is such that for all credentials c ∈ E there is a
credential c′ ∈ E′ where c = c′, we can revise it so that E ≺ E′ if for c ∈ E there is a credential
c′ ∈ E′ where c′ is identical to c except that it contains a role R′ that dominates the corresponding
role R in c. This p.o. generates the “intuitive” behavior of the abduction algorithm.
An eﬀective approximation of the above criterion is to include extra information in credentials
from the hypotheses (abducibles), specifying the position of a role in the role lattice hierarchy. We
called the extra information role weight indicating the highest possible position of a role in the
lattice. The counting is bottom-up starting from the most bottom role(s) and reﬂects the number
of roles the current one dominates with the direct path between them. So, if a role occurs in two
diﬀerent paths in the lattice, for example, once with weight 5 and once with 4 we select 5 as the
role weight. Then it is easy to select those sets with lowest possible role weights – addressing in this
case the least privileged principle. This is why we need the highest possible value because we can
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Figure 2: Joint Hierarchy Model
accurately compute the minimal privilege of the maximal importance of a role. After selecting the
minimal sets (there could be more than one equally minimal) we perform a minimal set cardinality
ﬁltering to choose the ﬁnal one. After having obtained the set of missing credentials, we drop this
extra information from the set that is to be sent back to the client.
7 Formalization of the Example
Figure 2 shows the joint hierarchy model of the roles at both institutions, Fraunhofer and University
of Trento. The partial order of roles is indicated by arcs, where higher the role in the hierarchy,
more powerful it is.
Deﬁnition 7.1 A role dominates another role if it is higher in the hierarchy and there is a direct
path between them.
Following is the full formalization of the running example introduced in §2. There is a prepro-
cessing step that validates and transforms certiﬁcates to predicates suitable for the formal model –
credential (User :U,Role :R). The new predicate used in the example is authNetwork (IP,DomainName).
It is a tuple with ﬁrst argument the IP address of the authorized network endpoint (the client’s
machine) and the second argument the domain name where the IP address comes from. Figure 3
shows the complete formalization of the policies.
Following is the functional explanation of the policies shown in Figure 3.
The access policy:
• Rules (1) and (2) give access to the shared network content to everybody from the University
of Trento and Fraunhofer institute, regardless the IP and roles at these institutions.
• Rules (3) and (4) allow access from those machines that are internal for the two institutions
and located in the internal LANs (dedicated machines only for Planet-Lab access) distin-
guished by their ﬁxed IPs.
• Rule (5) relaxes the previous two and allows access from any place of the institutions provided
users declare their ID and present some role-position certiﬁcate of their organization or at
least a Planet-Lab membership credential.
• Rules (6) and (7) say that if a user has got a light access and is, at minimum, researcher at
University of Trento or junior researcher at Fraunhofer, it has conﬁgure access rights.
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Access Policy:
(1) assign (∗, request(disk))← authNetwork (∗, ∗.unitn.it).
(2) assign (∗, request(disk))← authNetwork (∗, ∗.fraunhofer.de).
(3) assign (∗, request(run))← authNetwork (193.168.205.∗, ∗.unitn.it).
(4) assign (∗, request(run))← authNetwork (198.162.45.∗, ∗.fraunhofer.de).
(5) assign (User, request(run))← assign (User, request(disk)), declaration (User),
credential (User,Role), Role  memberP lanetLab.
(6) assign (User, request(configure))← assign (User, request(run)), declaration (User),
credential (User,Role), Role  researcher.
(7) assign (User, request(configure))← assign (User, request(run)), declaration (User),
credential (User,Role), Role  juniorResearcher.
(8) assign (User, request(configure))← authNetwork (∗, ∗.it), declaration (User),
credential (User,Role), Role  assProf.
(9) assign (User, request(configure))← authNetwork (∗, ∗.de), declaration (User),
credential (User,Role), Role  seniorResearcher.
(10) assign (User, request(configure))← declaration (User), credential (User,Role),
Role  fullP rof.
(11) assign (User, request(configure))← declaration (User), credential (User,Role),
Role  boardOfDirectors.
Disclosure Policy:
(1) declaration (User)← authNetwork (∗, ∗.unitn.it).
(2) declaration (User)← authNetwork (∗, ∗.fraunhofer.de).
(3) credential (memberP lanetLab,User)← declaration (User).
(4) credential (RoleX,User)← credential (RoleY, User), RoleX  RoleY.
Figure 3: Proxy Access and Release Policies for the Online Planet-Lab Services
• Rules (8) and (9) relaxed associate professors and senior researchers from the fact that they
can access the network resources from any place they want under the respective country
domain (e.g. home, other universities, etc).
• Rules (10) and (11) give full access, from any place of the world, only to members of board
of directors and to full professors.
The disclosure policy:
• Rules (1) and (2) disclose the need for the client to declare its ID if the same comes from an
authorized network of the respective organizations;
• Rule (3) discloses the need for Planet-Lab membership credential if the client has already
declared its ID;
• Rule (4) discloses (upgrades) the need of a higher role-position credential.
8 Interactive Access Control
In this section we show how the various notions that we have seen so far can be combined in a
comprehensive authorization mechanism. An authorization system receives a request r, processes
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it according to the access control algorithm and eventually takes a decision. A decision may have
involved interactions and so we also keep track of the current set of active credentials CP .
Since a client must have all relevant credentials (if required) for getting access to a service, one
could borrow mechanisms for certiﬁcate chain discovery [29, 6]. It is essential and important for
any trust management system.
Once again it is worth noting that this view is partial as we only focus on the knowledge of one
single autonomic node: there is no authorization domain crossing partnerships.
To allow for an easier grasp of the problem, we start with a basic framework shown in Figure 4.
This approach is the cornerstone of most logical formalizations [9]: if the request r is a consequence
of the policy and the credentials then access is granted otherwise it is denied.
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the policy (P) and credentials
(C), namely P ∪ C |= r,
2. if the check succeeds then grant access else deny access.
Figure 4: Traditional Access Control
A number of works has deemed such blunt denials unsatisfactory and therefore it has been
proposed by Bonatti and Samarati [5] and Yu et al. [42] to send back to the client some of the
rules that are necessary to gain additional access. Figure 5 shows the essence of the approaches.
In their work it is revised to allow for the ﬂow of rules and information to users.
1. verify that the request is a logical consequence of the policy (P) and credentials
(C), namely P ∪ C |= r,
2. if the check succeeds then grant access else
(a) select some rule(s) r ← p ∈ PartialEvaluation(P ∪ C),
(b) if such rule(s) exists then send the rule back to the client else deny access.
Figure 5: Disclosable Access Control
The systems proposed by both Bonatti and Samarati [5] and Yu et al. [42] are ﬂat, i.e. in p the
client will ﬁnd all missing credentials to continue the process until r is granted. In many cases, this
is neither suﬃcient nor desirable. For instance, if the policy is not ﬂat, it has constraints on the
credentials that can be presented at the same time (e.g., separation of duties) or a more complex
role structure is used, these systems would not be complete.
Our interactive access control solution is shown in Figure 6. The intuition behind the interactive
access control algorithm is the following. Initially a client will submit a set of credentials Cp and
a service request r. Cp is optional and so initially may be also an empty set. Once the client has
initiated a session, the interactive algorithm is started with internal input: the policy for access
control PA and policy for disclosure control PD.
Then the client’s proﬁle of CP and CN is update as: active credentials CP are updated with the
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Global vars: CN , CP , CM; Initially CN = CP = CM = ∅;
Input: Cp and r; Internal input: PA and PD;
Output: grant/deny/ask(CM);
1. update CP = CP ∪ Cp ,
2. update CN = CN ∪ (CM \ Cp), where CM is from the last interaction,
3. verify whether the request r is a security consequence of the policy access PA and the active
credentials CP , namely PA ∪ CP |= r and PA ∪ CP |= ⊥,
4. if the check succeeds then return grant else
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials CD as
CD = {c | c credential that PD ∪ CP |= c} \ (CN ∪ CP) ,
(b) use abduction to ﬁnd a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ CD such that both PA ∪
CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪ CP ∪ CM |= ⊥ ,
(c) if no such set exists then return deny else
(d) return ask(CM) and iterate the process.
Figure 6: Interactive Access Control Algorithm
newly presented credentials Cp; and declined credentials CN are updated as a set diﬀerence of what
the client was asked in the last interaction (CM) minus what he presents in the current interaction
(Cp), steps 1 and 2. After the client’s proﬁle is updated, the algorithm checks whether the request
r is granted by PA according to the client’s set of active credentials CP (step 3).
If the check in step 3 fails then is step 4a the algorithm computes all credentials disclosable from
PD according to CP and from the resulting set removes all already declined and already presented
credentials. In this case we avoid dead loops of asking something already declined or presented.
Then we compute (using abduction reasoning) all possible subsets of CD that are consistent with
the access policy PA and, at the same time, grant r. Out of all these sets (if any) the algorithm
selects the minimal one.
Example 4 A senior researcher at Fraunhofer institute FOKUS wants to reconﬁgure an online
service for paper submissions of a workshop. The service is part of a big management system
hosted at the University of Trento’s network that is part of the Planet-Lab network described in §7.
So, for doing that, at the time of access, he presents his employee membership token, issued by a
Fraunhofer certiﬁcate authority, presuming that it is enough as a potential customer.
Formally speaking, the request comes from a domain fokus.fraunhofer.de with credential for
Role :employee together with a declaration for a user ID, John Milburk. The set of credentials is:
{authNetwork (198.162.193.46, fokus.fraunhofer.de),
credential (JohnMilburk, employee),
declaration (JohnMilburk)}
So, according to the access policy the credentials are not enough to get configure access and the
request would be denied (ref. rules 7,9 and 11 in Figure 3). Then, following the algorithm (step 4a
in Figure 6) it is computed the set of disclosable credentials from the disclosure policy and the user’s
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set of active credentials. In our case, CP is the set of credentials mentioned above. The algorithm
computes CD as the need of all roles higher in position than Role :employee (ref. Figure 3 rule 4 of
Disclosure Policy):
{credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :juniorResearcher),
credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :seniorResearcher),
credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :boardOfDirectors)}
The next step, abduction (Figure 6 step 4b), computes the minimal set of credentials, out of those,
that satisﬁes the request. The resulting set is
{credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :juniorResearcher)}. Then the need for this credential is re-
turn back to the user.
On the next interaction step, because the user is a senior researcher, the same declines to present
the requested credential and returns the same query but with no presented credentials (Cp = ∅). So,
the algorithm updates the user’s proﬁle marking the requested credential
credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :juniorResearcher) as declined. The diﬀerence comes when
the algorithm re-computes the disclosable credentials as all disclosable credentials from the last
interaction minus the newly declined one:
{credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :seniorResearcher),
credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :boardOfDirectors)}
Abduction computation returns, as a missing set, the need for credential
credential (User :JohnMilburk,Role :seniorResearcher).
Then, because John Milburk is a senior researcher, he presents the required certiﬁcate back to the
system and gets the requested service.
Remark 2 Using declined credentials is essential to avoid loops in the process and to guarantee
the success of interaction in presence of disjunctive information.
For example suppose we have alternatives in the partner’s policy (e.g., “present either a VISA
or a Mastercard or an American Express card”). An arbitrary alternative can be selected by the
abduction algorithm and on the next interaction step (if the client has declined the credential)
the abduction algorithm is informed that the previous solution was not accepted. The process can
continue until all credentials have been declined (and access is denied) or a solution is found (and
access is granted).
This is all we need for autonomic processes made up by stateless services, in which all decisions
are taken on the basis of the current input set of credentials, and which envisaged to be the large
majority. This type of decision is characteristic of most logical approaches to access control [27, 4, 5]:
we only look at the policy, the request and the set of credentials.
It is possible to extend the approach to stateful autonomic nodes, as we shall see in §9.
8.1 Completeness and Correctness
At ﬁrst we introduce some preliminary deﬁnitions.
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Deﬁnition 8.1 (Solution Set for a Resource r) Let PA is an access policy and r be a request.
A set of credentials CS is a solution set for r according to PA if r is a security consequence of PA
and CS (PA ∪ CS |= r and PA ∪ CS |= ⊥).
Deﬁnition 8.2 (Disclosable and Hidden Credentials) Let PD be a disclosure policy, creden-
tial c is disclosable if there is a set of credentials C s.t. c ∈ C and C together with the disclosure
policy PD entails c, namely PD ∪ C |= c.
A credential c is hidden if it is not disclosable.
The intuition behind hidden credentials is that the system does not ask for them but expects them
from the client. So, the information for hidden credentials is obtained by out-of-band sources. Also,
from the point of view of a client, hidden credentials are just credentials that someone has told
him to provide them when requests a speciﬁc service. Hidden credentials are used either to unlock
more credentials needed to grant access or used directly to unlock a resource or used for both. So,
a client must provide them when initially requests a service. Essentially, the client can work in pull
mode with disclosable credentials and must work in push mode with hidden credentials.
Deﬁnition 8.3 (Hidden Credentials for a Resource r) A set of hidden credentials for a re-
source r is the set CH such that:
1. there exists a solution set CS for r that CS ⊇ CH and
2. all hidden credentials in CS are in CH.
In particular, all solution sets for a resource r could be hidden, i.e. for any solution CS and its
set of hidden credentials CH holds CH = CS , and we fall back in the standard, classical, access
control framework of having only grant/deny decisions. On the other hand, every solution CS for r
with hidden credentials equal to an empty set is just a solution for r, or can be interpreted as any
solution is a solution with hidden credentials where hidden credentials might be equal to empty
set. Also it might be a case that some solution sets for r have the same sets of hidden credentials.
Deﬁnition 8.4 (Fair Access) Let PA be an access control policy and let CPA be the set of ground
instances of all credentials occurring in PA. The policy PA guarantees fair access if for any request
r there exists a set CS ⊆ CPA that is a solution for r.
We can check fair access property by simply running the interactive algorithm for all resources
r ∈ PA and set up the disclosable credentials to all credentials occurring in PA. Then for each
request r the algorithm should return ask(CM) for some CM. If for some r it returns deny then
the fair access property fails.
Deﬁnition 8.5 (Fair Interaction) Let PA and PD be, respectively, an access and disclosure con-
trol policies. The policies guarantee fair interaction if
1. PA guarantees fair access and
2. if CS is a solution for a request r and CH is the set of hidden credentials for CS then the visible
part of CS is disclosable by PD ∪ CH, i.e. ∀c ∈ (CS \ CH), PD ∪ CH |= c.
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The intuition of fair interaction is that the hidden credentials in a solution set are all that is needed
to obtain the disclosure of the remaining disclosable credentials. For example setting up an e-mail
account my name@google.com is an example of fair interaction with hidden credentials. One needs
a form that is not available on the site but after the form, duly ﬁlled, has been sent some additional
information (credentials) is asked and the account is granted.
The intuition behind unfair interaction policies is that, even if we have all credentials necessary
to access, even if we know that some credentials (the hidden ones) must be sent in push mode, yet
this will not be enough to get an answer from the server. We will need to push other credentials
that are not needed for access but just to disclose the information on missing credentials.
Assuming that for each request r ∈ PA a service provider knows a priori all sets of hidden
credentials CH1, . . . , CHn we can check the fair interaction property by running the interactive
algorithm n-times with input: r and CHi, i = [1..n]. Then for each request r and each run the
algorithm should return either ask(CM) or grant. If for some r in some runs it returns deny then
the fair interaction property fails.
If a service provider does not know the set of hidden credentials these can again be calculated
from the disclosure policies by using the abduction algorithm on the disclosure policy.
Deﬁnition 8.6 (Powerful Client) A powerful client is a client that whenever receives ask(CM)
returns CM.
Deﬁnition 8.7 (Cooperative Client) A client with a set of credentials C is a cooperative client
if whenever receives ask(CM) returns CM ∩ C.
Deﬁnition 8.8 (Client with Hidden Credentials for a Resource r) A client with hidden cre-
dentials for a resource r is any client that has the set of hidden credentials CH of a solution set for
r and whenever requests r he sends CH initially.
Deﬁnition 8.9 (Monotonic and Non-monotonic Policy) A policy P is monotonic if when-
ever a set of statements C is a solution set for r according to P (P ∪ C |= r) then any superset
C′ ⊃ C is also a solution set for r according to P (P ∪ C′ |= r).
In contrast, a non-monotonic policy is a logic program in which if C is a solution for r it may
exists C′ ⊃ C that is not a solution for r, i.e. P ∪ C′ |= r
Deﬁnition 8.10 (Resource r Additive Policy) A policy P is a resource r additive if for every
two sets of statements C and C′, where C ⊂ C′ and C′ ⊂ C, that unlock the resource r according to
P then also C ∪ C′ unlocks r according to P .
In other words, if you have two solutions for a service you can ”add” them and you will still
get the service.
Deﬁnition 8.11 (Resource r Subset Consistent Policy) A policy P is a resource r subset
consistent if for every solution set CS for r holds that each C ⊆ CS preserves consistency in P , i.e.
P ∪ C |= ⊥.
The intuition behind a subset consistent policy is that inconsistency occurs because of separation
of duty. So this type of constraints rule out situation in which a client has too many privileges.
Situations where having less credentials than enough to get a service makes the system inconsistent
are neither practical nor intuitive from an access control point of view.
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Proposition 8.1 (Suﬃcient Condition for Subset Consistency) Let PA be an access pol-
icy. If the number of negations from a literal in the body of a constraint to a credential in PA is
even then PA is subset consistent.
Proof. Let assume that the number of negations from a literal in the body of a rule to a
credential in PA is even and the policy PA is not subset consistent. Then let CS be a solution set
for a request r and let C ⊆ CS such that PA ∪ C |= ⊥. Then because CS preserves consistency and
the fact that no credential occurs in a head of a rule in PA (ref. Def. 6.1) follows that inconsistency
occurs from reducing the number of credentials in the system. Reducing credentials either directly
aﬀects a constraint having negation of a literal that is a credential belonging to CS \ C or indirectly
aﬀects a constraint that has a positive literal, which by its side is deduced from a rule in PA that
has either negation or a positive literal in the body. If negation in the latter case then it is a missing
credential. In both cases the number of negations is 1 which is odd. If we apply recursively the
same rule for a positive literal in the latter case we will compute again odd number of negations.
In any way we have a contradiction with what we assumed. With this we ﬁnish the proof.
Deﬁnition 8.12 (Well-behaved Policy) A policy P is well-behaved if for all resources r ∈ P
(i) P is resource r additive and
(ii) P is resource r subset consistent.
The set of well-behaved policies resides between monotonic and arbitrary policies.
Proposition 8.2 All monotonic policies are well-behaved but the converse is not true.
Proof. In one direction the property is immediate: if a policy PA is monotonic then, according
Def. 8.9, if a set CS is a solution for a request r then also any superset is. So if CS′ is as another
solution set for r, so also CS ∪ CS ′ is a solution because of the superset property. The subset
consistency property always holds for monotonic policies since inconsistent states are not considered
for those.
For the other way round we show a counter-example:
r1 ← CA.
r1 ← CB .
r2 ← CC .
← CA, CC .
← CB , CC .
In our case having {CA, CB , CC} bans the client to get either of the services, which clearly shows
that the example is a non-monotonic policy. At the same time, for each of the services we have
additive and subset consistent properties so that the policy is well-behaved.
Remark 3 Hereinafter all access policies PA will be well-behaved policies and all disclosure poli-
cies PD will be monotonic policies unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise.
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Also we assume that a client initiates a service request with an empty set of presented credentials
or, if hidden credentials needed, the presented credentials are the hidden ones. The assumption is
important to avoid initial inconsistency and to assure that a client has a successful ﬁrst step.
Whenever hidden credentials are not explicitly linked in the theorems we assume that for each
request r in PA its set of hidden credentials CH = ∅. The assumption mainly reﬂects the use of
Deﬁnition 8.5 for fair interaction. We apply the same deﬁnition but with no CH meaning that for
any request r each of its solution sets is disclosable by the disclosure policy.
Deﬁnition 8.13 (Completeness) If a client has a solution for a request r then he eventually
gets grant r.
Deﬁnition 8.14 (Soundness) If a client gets grant r then he has a solution for r.
Theorem 8.1 (Soundness) Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request.
If a client gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 6 then he has a solution set CS that unlocks r
according to PA.
Proof. This proof is rather straightforward. Let suppose that the client, requested service r,
got grant. The only way to get it is when PA ∪ CP |= r. There are two cases: either CP = ∅ or
CP = ∅.
If CP = ∅ then the resource r is not protected by PA, i.e. PA |= r. So, the ∅ is a solution for r
and the client has it.
If CP = ∅ then the only way to introduce a credential in CP is by step 1 of the algorithm.
Since initially CP = ∅ so the client has sent a sequence of sets of credentials Cp1, . . . , Cpn such that⋃n
i=1 Cp i = CP . Then the client has a set of credentials that unlocks it.
Theorem 8.2 (Termination) Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a
request. The access control algorithm in Figure 6 always terminates.
Proof. To prove this claim simply observe that at each interaction the union of the presented
credentials or the declined credentials occurring in the access policy always increases. Since this
set is bounded by the credentials occurring in the access policy there is always a stage in which
either grant is given (enough presented credentials to unlock the service) or deny is sent (too many
declined credentials to ﬁnd another set of missing credentials).
8.2 Completeness for Powerful and Cooperative Clients
The most important thing is also the most diﬃcult to prove: a client who has the right set of
credentials and who is willing to send them to the server, will not be left stranded in our autonomic
network and will eventually get grant.
We prove this result in stages: ﬁrst for powerful clients and then for cooperative clients. We
notice that it is fairly diﬃcult to prove any results for non-cooperative clients: if they are unwilling
to send the credentials to the server, how can ever the server grants them access? However, if at
least the client is willing to give his credentials if the server guess the right combination can also
be captured.
Theorem 8.3 (Completeness for a Powerful Client) Let PA be a non-monotonic access pol-
icy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request. If PA and PD guarantee fair access and interaction
then a powerful client always gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 6.
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Proof. A powerful client requests r with an initial set of presented credentials equal to empty
set. Then the algorithm runs steps 1 and 2. If step 3 succeeds (no credentials are needed for r)
then the algorithm returns grant at step 4 and we are done.
If step 3 does not succeed then the algorithm goes to step 4a. At this point CN = CP = ∅. In
this case CD consists of all credentials disclosable by PD. Then in step 4b the abduction algorithm
will return a set CM that unlocks r because
(i) PA guarantees fair access and so a solution set CS for r exists,
(ii) since PD satisﬁes the property fair interaction and CH = ∅ so CS is disclosed by PD,
(iii) clearly CS is a subset of CD, because CD consists of all credentials disclosable by PD.
So, step 4c is not reached and in step 4d the algorithm returns ask(CM) which satisﬁes the two
conditions of step 4b.
If there is only one solution that unlocks r then CM = CS .
Since the client is a powerful client then on the next interaction he returns CM. Then the
algorithm updates CP = CM and CN = ∅ and because CM satisﬁes the two conditions in step 4b,
in the last interaction, so it also satisﬁes the conditions in step 3 and in step 4 it returns grant.
Theorem 8.4 (Completeness for a Cooperative Client) Let PA be an access policy, PD be
a disclosure policy and r a request. If PA and PD guarantee fair access and interaction then if a
cooperative client has a set of credentials CS that unlocks r according to PA then the client always
gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 6.
Proof. We will proof it in two steps. First step, by induction, showing that in a single
interaction if a cooperative client does not get grant r then he gets ask(CM). In other words, he
will never receive denial by the algorithm. Second step, we will show that if the ﬁrst step is true
then a cooperative client with a solution set CS always gets grant r.
Step 1.
Proof by induction on the interaction steps:
Inter. 1: Client requests service r together with an initial set of credentials Cp = ∅ and we
fall back exactly in the proof of Theorem 8.3 for that interaction step.
Inter. N: Here we use the induction hypothesis that the client fails to get grant r and gets
ask(CM) in the previous interaction. Now, suppose that the client fails to get grant r in step
3. The only way it fails is that there is no solution set in CP . It is because in CP there are
only credentials partially compiled from solutions for r, i.e. CP ⊂ (CM1 ∪ . . . ∪ CMn). Then
since PA is well-behaved so CP preserves consistency in PA.
So, after the check failed in step 3 the algorithm computes the set of disclosable credentials CD
as all credentials disclosable by PD ∪CP minus all already declined and presented credentials.
Because PA and PD guarantee fair access and interaction so CS ⊆ (CD ∪ CP) but CS ⊆ CP .
Then at least the set diﬀerence CS \ CP will be computed by the abduction engine because:
(i) (CS \ CP) ⊆ CD and (ii) (CS ∪ CP) ⊂ (CM1 ∪ . . . ∪ CMn ∪ CS) preserves consistency (ref.
Def. 8.12 and Def. 8.11). And so the step 4c is skipped the client gets ask(CM).
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Step 2. So, in Step 1 we proved that if a cooperative client does not get grant r, in a single
interaction step, he gets ask(CM). Then we have to prove that in a ﬁnite number of steps a
cooperative client will always get grant r.
There is a ﬁnite number of solutions for each request r simply because PA consists of a ﬁnite
number of statements. The abduction reasoning service at each interaction computes diﬀerent
solution wrt the solutions computed in previous interactions because from the disclosable credentials
we remove all those credentials from the previous interactions (ref. step 4a in Fig. 6).
So, since there are ﬁnite solution sets for r and since the client has one of them therefore
according to what we proved in Step 1 the client in a ﬁnite number of interaction steps will
disclose CS , i.e. CS ⊆ CP , and get grant r.
Theorem 8.5 (Completeness for a Powerful Client with Hidden Credentials) Let PA be
an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request. If PA and PD guarantee fair access
and interaction then a powerful client with hidden credentials CH for r always gets grant r with the
algorithm in Figure 6.
Proof. A powerful client requests r with an initial set of presented credentials equal to the set
of hidden credentials, i.e. Cp = CH. Then the algorithm runs steps 1 and 2. At this point CP = CH
and CN = ∅. If step 3 succeeds, CH itself is a solution set for r, then the algorithm returns grant at
step 4 and we are done.
If step 3 does not succeed then the algorithm goes to step 4a. In this case CD consists of all
credentials disclosable by PD and CH because CP = CH. Then in step 4b the abduction algorithm
will return a set CM because at least one such set exists:
(i) PA and PD guarantee fair access and interaction and so for the solution set CS , corresponding
to the set of hidden credentials CH that the client has, its visible part CS \CH will be disclosed
by PD and CH (ref. Def. 8.5),
(ii) clearly (CS \ CH) ⊆ CD, because CD consists of all credentials disclosable by PD ∪ CH,
(iii) according to Deﬁnition 8.3 the set CH ⊆ CS and so the set CS \ CH together with CP preserve
consistency in PA (simply because (CS \ CH) ∪ CP = CS is a solution set),
So, step 4c is not reached and in step 4d the algorithm returns ask(CM) which satisﬁes the two
conditions of step 4b.
It may be the case in which the set CH unlocks more than one solution sets if those solution
sets have the same set of hidden credentials.
Since the client is a powerful client then on the next interaction he returns CM. Then the
algorithm updates CP = CH ∪ CM and CN = ∅ and because CM satisﬁes the two conditions in step
4b, from the last interaction, so it also satisﬁes the conditions in step 3 and in step 4 it returns
grant. With this we ﬁnish the proof.
Theorem 8.6 (Completeness for a Cooperative Client with Hidden Credentials) Let PA
be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request. If PA and PD guarantee fair access
and interaction then if a cooperative client with hidden credentials CH for r has a solution set CS
for CH then the client always gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 6.
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Proof. Analogously of theorem 8.4 we will proof it in two steps. First step, by induction,
showing that in a single interaction if the client does not get grant r then he gets ask(CM). In
other words, he will never receive denial by the algorithm. Second step, we will show that if the
ﬁrst step is true then the client with a solution set CS always gets grant r.
Proof by induction on the interaction steps:
Inter. 1: Client requests service r together with an initial set of credentials Cp = CH and we
fall back exactly in the proof of Theorem 8.5 for that interaction step.
Inter. N: Here we use the induction hypothesis that the client fails to get grant r and gets
ask(CM) in the previous interaction. Now, suppose that the client fails to get grant r in step
3. Then the only diﬀerence with the respective interaction step in the proof of Theorem 8.4
is that the client’s solution set CS is still disclosable by PD and CP because CH is already in
the set CP , see Deﬁnition 8.3. So, according to fair interaction property follows that CS \ CH
is visible and the abduction service at least ﬁnds it as a solution.
The rest of the proof can be done along the same line as in Theorem 8.4.
9 Stateful Systems
Stateful systems are systems where the status of the current state depends on the status of the
system in past conditions, i.e. access decision can change depending on past interactions or past
presented credentials. Such systems can easily become inconsistent wrt a client’s set of presented
credentials mainly because access decisions depend also on the history of past executions. To
address the problem of inconsistency, this chapter extends the basic framework, described in §8, so
that it allows a service provider to reason of not only what missing credentials are needed but also
to ﬁnd out what the excessing (conﬂicting) is among the clients set of presented credentials that
makes the policy state inconsistent.
Past requests or services may deny access to future services as in Bertino et al [4] centralized
access control model for workﬂows. Separation of duties means that we cannot extend privileges
by supplying more credentials. For instance a branch manager of a bank clearing a cheque cannot
be the same member of staﬀ who has emitted the cheque [4, pag.67]. If we have no memory of
past credentials then it is impossible to enforce any security policy for separation of duties on the
application workﬂow. The problems that could cause a process to get stuck are the following:
• the request may be inconsistent with some role, action or event from the client in the past;
• the new set of credential may be inconsistent with requirements such as separation of duties;
To execute a service of the fragment of a partner, the user will submit a set of presented
credentials Cp , a set of revoked credentials Cr and a service request r. We assume that Cp and Cr
are disjoint. We also need to keep a memory of past credentials submitted by a user. This is the
role of CP , the set of active credentials that have been presented by the client in past requests to
other services within the domain of a partner.
In many workﬂow authorization schemes, the policy alone is not suﬃcient to make an access
control decision and thus we need to identify a history of execution H of services under the control
of a partner. It keeps track on what has been done by the system and what is the current status
of it.
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Global Vars: CP , H;
Initially: CP = ∅ and H = ∅;
ServiceRequest(r, Cp , Cr ){ // starts a new thread
1. resultaccess = InteractiveAccessControl(r, Cp , Cr );
2. Update(H, resultaccess, r);
3. if resultaccess == grant then
4. resultservice = InvokeService(r);
5. Update(H, resultservice, r);
6. endif
}
Figure 7: Global Initialization and Service Management
9.1 Initialization and Service
Figure 7 gives the intuition of possible management of services wrt the access control decision
process and its relevant data sets. The algorithm shown in Figure 7 works like web servers. A
main web server listens to service requests and whenever a request is detected the server runs the
algorithm in a new thread and initializes the global variables H and CP to empty sets. Of course
here it should distinguish between the very ﬁrst initialization and any further loading of those data
sets simply because we do not want to loose any data from past interactions. For further loadings
we keep a proﬁle for each client with the respective data set CP so that when the client accesses
again a service we just load CP .
Both CP and H are local to a service provider and are managed and initialized independently.
The history of execution H is set up to an empty set at the start when a particular business process
is started3. Even a business partner may decide to have for each running business process separate
histories H. To this extend we assume that H is mapped to those business process(es) that are
relevant to the authorization logic and is released when those processes complete their executions.
Another session proﬁle is the set of active user’s access rights CP available to the partner’s
application domain. Each session is associated with a single user and each user is associated with
a single session. This session proﬁle is created when the user for the ﬁrst time requests a service
under the partner’s domain. In contrast to the history proﬁle, the set of user’s access rights is
valid until a certain time slot expires4. Even more, it is valid across multiple runnings of business
processes within the entire scope of the partner’s domain and it eventual deactivation depends on
the partner’s authorization logic. The set of active credentials CP , as shown in Figure 7, is updated
as a side-eﬀect of the execution of InteractiveAccessControl function and later, in §9.2, we will
show how CP is managed.
The third session proﬁle, kept in the model, is for the service level negotiation. Here, each
session is associated with a single user but each user is associated with one or more negotiation
sessions. Whenever a user requests a service (ref. ServiceRequest(. . . ) in Figure 7) it is created a
session within which the interactive access control algorithm is running. Once the session is created
the user interacts with the system until a ﬁnal decision of grant or deny is taken. Within these
3It entirely depends on the provider’s business logic and whenever an application business process is started we
refer to it as an initial point to set up H = ∅
4The set CP is strictly time-dependent and must be periodically cleared up from already expired credentials.
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interactions a user (de)activates some subset of roles (⊆ CP) that he or she is assigned.
In comparison with RBAC model, the service level agreement session corresponds to the user sessions(u:USE
function as introduced by Ferraiolo et al. [11], which is the mapping of a user u onto a set of active
sessions. The user session of active rights corresponds to
avail session perms(user sessions(u:USERS)) introduced in [11]. Where
avail session perms(s:SESSIONS) returns the permissions available to a user in a session. We note
that the user’s session of active access rights in our framework extends the one in [11] because in
CP one can also ﬁnd access credentials from already concluded service level sessions but with still
valid expiration dates.
To keep the history of execution H up-to-date, after each interaction step appropriate predicates
should be added indicating what has been done by the system. This is done by the function Update
shown in Figure 7. The table below summarizes the possible updates of H.
Algorithm output Status Predicates
grant grant (User :U,Service :S,Number :N ),
running (User :U,Service :S,Number :N)
deny deny (User :U,Service :S,Number :N)
Service Execution Status Predicates
accomplished success (User :U,Service :S,Number :N )
failed abort (User :U,Service :S,Number :N)
The temporal evolution of the access rights wrt the history of execution H can be complex
because even the most simple constraint on executed actions may block a request. Indeed, the set
of requests that must be grantable by the policy may change with the services that we have used.
As intuitively expected, we may have access to less services if we have limitations on their usage.
For instance the following constraint speciﬁes that the service reviewSellBids cannot be executed
more than three times in a workﬂow session:
← assign (User :U,Service :reviewSellBids),
4 ≤ {N. success (User :U,Service :reviewSellBids,Number :N )} .
9.2 Interactive Access Control for Stateful Systems
Once a client makes a service request, the authorization mechanism starts a session in which the
client iterates with the system until a ﬁnal decision of grant or deny is taken. In the same session
context, we keep a set of declined credentials CN , a set of missing credentials CM and a set of
excessing credentials5 CE . The set CN consists of credentials that the client has refused to present
to the system during an authorization session. The sets CM and CE keep information from the
output of the last interaction. Once the session is started, the algorithm loads the policies for
access and disclosure control PA and PD together with the two sets: the history of execution H
and the client’s active credentials CP .
Our interactive access control solution for stateful services and applications is shown in Figure
8. The logical explanation of the algorithm is the following. The algorithm’s input consists of
client’s sets of currently presented credentials Cp, revoked ones Cr and the service request r. When
5excessing credentials can be also referred to as conflicting credentials
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Global vars: CN , CM, CE ; Initially CN = CM = CE = ∅;
Input: Cp , Cr and r; Internal input: PA, PD, H, CP ;
Output: grant/deny/<ask(CM),revoke(CE)>;
1. update CP = (CP \ Cr ) ∪ Cp ,
2. update CN = CN ∪ (CM \ Cp), where CM is from the last interaction,
3. set up CM = CE = ∅,
4. verify whether the request r is a security consequence of the policy access PA and the active credentials
CP , namely PA ∪H ∪ CP |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CP |= ⊥,
5. if the check succeeds then return grant else
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials CD = {c | PD ∪ CP |= c} \ (CN ∪ CP),
(b) use abduction to ﬁnd a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ CD such that both PA ∪ H ∪
CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CP ∪ CM |= ⊥ ,
(c) if a set CM exists then return <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> and iterate else
i. for every c ∈ CP introduce a new credential cˆ in the language,
ii. use abduction to ﬁnd a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ {cˆ | c ∈ CP}∪CD such that
• PA ∪H ∪ {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP} ∪ CM |= r,
• PA ∪H ∪ {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP} ∪ CM |= ⊥,
iii. if no set CM exists then return deny else
A. compute CE = {c | cˆ ∈ CM} and CM = CM ∩ CD,
B. return <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> and iterate.
Figure 8: Interactive Access Control Algorithm for Stateful Services
a client requests a speciﬁc service the authorization mechanism creates a new session and initializes
to empty sets the variables CN , CM and CE .
Then, the set of active credentials CP is updated by removing the revoked ones Cr from it
and then adding the new credentials (ref. step 1). The declined credentials CN are updated by
credentials the client was asked in the previous interaction minus the ones that he has currently
presented. Step 3 prepares the two sets CM and CE for the interaction output.
After the client’s proﬁle is updated, the algorithm checks whether the request r is granted by PA
according to the client’s set of active credentials CP (step 4). If the check fails then in step 5a the
algorithm computes all credentials disclosable from PD and CP and from the resulting set removes
all already declined and presented credentials. In this way we avoid dead loops of asking something
already declined or presented. Step 5b computes (using abduction reasoning) a (minimal) solution
for r. This is essentially our own interactive access control algorithm for stateless services presented
in §8.
If in step 7c no CM exists then we come to the part of the algorithm devoted to stateful systems.
The motivation here is that if a solution for r cannot be found in CD it means that
• either the client does not have enough privileges to get the disclosure of more missing creden-
tials so that the abduction can ﬁnd a solution
• or in the client’s set of credentials CP there is something “wrong” that bans the client to get
any solution, i.e. it makes PA inconsistent.
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In the ﬁrst case there is nothing you can do and we should just quietly deny access. In the second
case we could have a possibility for recovery.
So, following the second case, in steps 5(c)i and 5(c)ii, we use abduction over the set of disclosable
and active credentials CD ∪ CP searching for a possible solution CM that unlocks r and preserves
consistency in PA∪H. If a solution for r is found it clearly indicates that this solution could not be
found in step 5b because of the existence of “wrong” credentials in CP that makes PA inconsistent.
In this case we compute the set of excessing credentials CE as the set diﬀerence CP \ CM. Here we
separate the deﬁnitely good (consistent) solution CM from the rest in CP .
Notice that steps 5(c)i–5(c)iii could be simpliﬁed by simply setting CE = CP and CP = ∅, i.e.
asking the client to revoke everything and restart from scratch. We believe that this is hardly
practical. We want to have a more precise control on the revokable credentials i.e. of being able
to compute a minimal set of revokable and missing credentials. To do so we introduce for each
credential c ∈ CP a new symbol for it cˆ in the model, step 5(c)i in Figure 8. Then after obtaining
the set of new symbols {cˆ | c ∈ CP} we generate a set of rules {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP}. The trick here
is that negating all credentials in CP using the newly introduced symbols and running abduction
reasoning over the set union of {cˆ | c ∈ CP} ∪ CD (step 5(c)ii) allows us to ﬁnd a minimal solution
CM for r that itself indicates what should be revoked and what should be asked from the client.
Let us consider the set {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP}. Since we attach this set to PA ∪ H ∪ CP so it
follows that all credentials in CP will be deduced again except those that the corresponding new
symbol appears in CM. So, all new-symbol credentials appearing in CM, computed in step 7(c)ii,
will be treated such that the absence of their respective credentials in CP allows the abduction
reasoning to ﬁnd a solution set for r. The solution itself may contain credentials from CD and if so
these credentials should be asked as missing ones from the client.
Remark 4 (Multiple Activations and Revocations of Credentials) In an interactive access
control process the algorithm may ask the client to present credentials that he has revoked (was ex-
plicitly asked for that) in previous interactions or ask the client to revoke credentials that the same
has already activated.
Since we do not know what solution a client has for a particular resource so in the presence of
alternatives in the access policy the system may choose the “wrong” one6 such that later on when
the right alternative is chosen it may require the revocation/activation of credentials that were
already activated/revoked by the client in the interactions with the“wrong” one.
Example 5 Abstracting from a speciﬁc meaning and for the sake of simplicity let us have the
following scenario. A client with a set of available credentials {CA, CB , CC} wants to access a
service r. The client’s set of active credentials (already presented to the system) is CP = {CC} and
history H = ∅. The policies for access and disclosure control are shown below.
Access Policy PA Disclosure Policy PD
r← CA, CB . CA ← .
r ← CC , CD. CB ← .
← CA, CC . CC ← .
CD ← .
Now let suppose that the client initially requests service r with set of presented credentials Cp =
{CA}.
6Here we call “wrong” alternative a solution set that the client does not have it.
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Then according to the algorithm in Figure 8 the check in step 4 will fail, then in step 5b abduction
will not ﬁnd any solution because the policy is inconsistent with the client’s set of credentials and
so the algorithm will reach step 5(c)ii. The variables and their respective values are listed in the
table below.
H CP PA ∪H ∪ {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP} CD CN {cˆ | c ∈ CP} ∪ CD
∅ {CA, CC} r ← CA, CB. {CB, CD} ∅ {CˆA, CˆC , CB, CD}
r ← CC , CD.
← CA, CC .
CA ← not CˆA.
CC ← not CˆC .
The output of this step considering the minimality criterion subset containment is:
• Abduction output: {CˆA, CD}, algorithm result: ask({CD}), revoke({CA})
• Abduction output: {CˆC , CB}, algorithm result: ask({CB}), revoke({CC})
Here it comes the point where Remark 4 takes place. Since we do not know what credentials and
especially what solution the client has in possession we must choose one of the two outcomes listed
above.
If we are lucky and choose the solution <ask({CB}), revoke({CC})> then on the next inter-
action since the client has in possession the set {CA, CB , CC} the same presents CB and revokes
CC obtaining grant r in step 5 at the next interaction.
In the other case, if we choose the solution <ask({CD}), revoke({CA})> then on the next
interaction the client will revoke CA but will decline to present CD, simply because he does not have
it. Then the check in step 4 will not succeed because CP = {CC} does not contain enough credentials
to unlock r. Following that, the abduction reasoning is step 5b will not ﬁnd a solution because in
CP there is a credentials CC that is inconsistent with the only solution available in CD = {CA, CB}.
Running again abduction reasoning with minimality according subset containment the only
solution found is {CˆC , CA, CB} and the respective outcome of the algorithm is ask({CA, CB}),
revoke({CC}). Essentially, we ask the client to restart from scratch, i.e. to revoke all of his active
credentials (CE = CP = {CC}) such that he can start from an initial (consistent) state of the system.
On the next interaction since the client has in possession {CA, CB , CC} so he revokes CC ,
presents {CA, CB} and in step 5 gets grant r.
9.3 Coping with Malicious Clients
We need to improve the algorithm in Figure 8 to protect the server against Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. To do so we consider the client as an entity that can manipulate the system only via its
input sets of credentials Cp and Cr . Particularly, he may present in his input set Cp credentials,
which he has revoked in past interactions with the system, without been explicitly asked for it and,
respectively, may revoke credentials in Cr , which he has activated and presented to the system in
past interactions, again without been asked for it. In both cases it would turn the system in a
previous state (by letting it compute the same solution again and again). A malicious client could
thus waste server’s time forever.
Example 6 (Malicious Behavior) Considering Example 5 with the same initial conditions let
us play the following scenario. Again the client submits CA when initially requests r. Then on
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Global vars: CN , CR, CU , CM, CE ; Initially CN = CR = CU = CM = CE = ∅;
Input: Cp , Cr and r; Internal input: PA, PD, H, CP ;
Output: grant/deny/<ask(CM),revoke(CE)>;
1. update CR = (CR \ CM) ∪ (Cr ∩ CE),
2. update CP = (CP \ CR) ∪ (Cp \ CR) ∪ (Cp ∩ CM) ∪ (Cp ∩ CN ),
3. update CN = CN ∪ (CM \ Cp),
4. update CU = CU ∪ (CE \ Cr ),
5. set up CM = CE = ∅,
6. verify whether PA ∪H ∪ CP |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CP |= ⊥,
7. if the check succeeds then return grant else
(a) compute the set of disclosable credentials
CD = {c | PD ∪ CP |= c} \ (CN ∪ CP),
(b) use abduction to ﬁnd a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ CD such that both PA ∪ H ∪
CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CP ∪ CM |= ⊥ ,
(c) if a set CM exists then return <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> and iterate else
i. for every c ∈ (CP \ CU) introduce a new credential cˆ in the language,
ii. use abduction to ﬁnd a minimal set of missing credentials CM ⊆ {cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CU)} ∪ CD
such that
• PA ∪H ∪ (CP ∩ CU ) ∪ {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ (CP \ CU)} ∪ CM |= r,
• PA ∪H ∪ (CP ∩ CU ) ∪ {c← not cˆ. | c ∈ (CP \ CU)} ∪ CM |= ⊥,
iii. if no set CM exists then return deny else
A. compute CE = {c | cˆ ∈ CM} and CM = CM ∩ CD,
B. return <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> and iterate.
Figure 9: Extended Interactive Access Control Algorithm
the next step the algorithm in Figure 8 returns <ask(CB), revoke(CC)> which is one of the two
alternatives at this step and we refer to Example 5 for details. Next, since the client is a malicious
one, he decides to present CB but declines to revoke CC in the next interaction. So, the client’s
set of active credentials becomes CP = {CA, CB , CC} and the algorithm’s output in this interaction
step is <ask(∅), revoke(CC)>.
Observing the algorithm’s behavior, now the client decides to revoke not only credential CC but
also his initially submitted credential CA. After the update in the next step, the client’s set of
active credentials becomes CP = {CB}. According to minimality criterion subset containment the
algorithm returns <ask(CA), revoke(∅)> which immediately hints the client that the set of three
credentials CA, CB , CC makes the system state inconsistent. So, at this point the client can easily
turn the system in a previous state by presenting CA and CC and the expected response by the
algorithm on the next interaction is <ask(∅), revoke(CC)>.
The new algorithm is shown in Figure 9. In step 1, a new data set is introduced, the set
of revoked credentials CR, which accumulates all credentials revoked by a client in an interaction
session for a particular service r. So, step 1 updates the set of revoked credentials by removing
from CR the set of missing credentials CM, asked in the last interaction, and adding to the resulting
set the set of newly revoked credentials Cr . The motivation for the set diﬀerence CR \ CM is that
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whatever the client presents from CM it is dropped from CR because it is not any more revoked
and whatever it is not presented in CM but is dropped from CR is added to the set of declined
credentials CN . In this case revoked and declined credentials are kept disjoint, i.e. CR ∩ CN = ∅.
Extending further step 1, to prevent situations of revoking credentials not supposed to be
revoked by the client, we update CR by adding only those credentials from Cr that the client was
explicitly asked in the previous interaction, i.e. adding only Cr ∩ CE .
Step 2 updates the client set of active credentials by removing from CP the set of all revoked
credentials and adding to it the set of newly activated credentials Cp. First we use the set diﬀerence
CP \ CR to remove all revoked credentials and second, expanding the set of active credentials, we
add from currently presented credentials Cp only the credentials that have not been revoked before
– Cp \ CR – and we add also those credentials in Cp that the system has asked the client – Cp ∩ CM
– or the client has declined to present in past interactions but it is presenting now – Cp ∩ CN .
In other words, step 2 allows the client to activate credentials among those:
• that the system has asked him to present in the last interaction or
• that he has denied to present in past interactions or
• brand new credentials7 that the client has not supplied to the system at the time of interacting.
Then, in step 4, we introduce a new data set CU . The role of CU is analogous of that for CN and
serves as a data store for those credentials that a client has declined to revoke in an interaction
session. CU is updated by adding to it the set diﬀerence of excessing credentials the client was asked
in the last interaction minus the ones currently revoked. Similarly, once a client refuses to revoke
a credential the same credential will not be considered in a possible output again.
We note that the client at any time can present credentials that he has declined to present
in previous interactions, although he will never be asked for them again, but he is not allowed
(the system will not consider) to revoke credentials that he has refused to revoke before without
been asked for it. The last requirement is mainly because the revocation of credentials is usually a
cumbersome process and once the client refuses to revoke a credential then it is unlikely to expect
him to do it later in a negotiation process.
Another diﬀerence of the algorithm wrt a malicious behavior is in step 7(c)ii. Here we run the
abduction reasoning over the set {cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CU )} ∪ CD. The set diﬀerence CP \ CU comes from
the fact that we do not want to ask the client to revoke credentials that he has already refused to
revoke. In this way we rule out those models where the client already denied to comply to. We
also note that the two conditions in step 7(c)ii are analogous with their respective ones in Figure
8 because whatever we drop from CP \ CU we add it by the intersection of CP ∩ CU .
Now on, wherever we refer to the access control algorithm we refer to its extended model shown
in Figure 9.
9.4 Completeness and Correctness
In the following we assume that the sets of missing and excessing credentials are disjoint, i.e.
CM ∩ CE = ∅, otherwise the client will reject the answer. Note that this is true for the interactive
algorithm in Figure 9. We also assume that at any time in an interaction process the sets of
currently presented and revoked credentials are disjoint, i.e. Cp ∩ Cr = ∅.
7excluding the revoked credentials since the system is aware of them.
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Deﬁnition 9.1 (Powerful and Compliant Client) A powerful and compliant client is a client
that whenever receives <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> returns <CM,CE>, i.e. activates all c ∈ CM and
revokes any c ∈ CE .
Deﬁnition 9.2 (Cooperative and Compliant Client) A client with ability to manage (obtain
or revoke) a set of credentials C is a cooperative and compliant client if whenever receives <ask(CM),revoke(CE
returns <CM ∩ C, CE ∩ C>, i.e. activates all c ∈ (CM ∩ C) and revokes any c ∈ (CE ∩ C).
Proposition 9.1 If a client has a set of credentials C then in all executions of the algorithm his
set of active credentials CP never exceeds C, i.e. CP ⊆ C.
Proposition 9.2 If a client has a set of credentials C then in all executions the excessing credentials
CE , he could be potentially asked, are among those in C, i.e. CE ⊆ C.
Proof. The proof is trivial and it follows straightforwardly from the algorithm’s structure.
Step 7(c)iiiA computes excessing credentials from the set of active credentials CP , i.e. CE ⊆ CP .
Then according to Proposition 9.1 follows that CE ⊆ C.
Proposition 9.3 For any client with the set of credentials C is valid that CE ∩ C = CE .
Lemma 9.1 Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request. If the algorithm
in Figure 9 returns <ask(CM), revoke(CE)> then either CM = ∅ or CE = ∅.
Proof. We will prove the claim in two parts. First part considering the output <ask(CM),
revoke(CE )> returned in step 7c and showing that it is diﬀerent than <ask(∅), revoke(∅)> and the
second part showing the same but for the output in step 7(c)iiiB.
Proving the ﬁrst part is rather straightforward and it follows from the fact that if we assume
that CM = ∅ (no need of extra access rights) then in the step 7b before we contradict with the fact
that the client does not have enough access rights. So, CM = ∅.
The second part we will prove by again assuming the converse and showing that it contradicts
with some facts. So, let assume that the algorithm in step 7(c)ii ﬁnds CM and in step 7(c)iiiA
computes CE = ∅. It means that there is no new-symbol credential cˆ ∈ CM, where CM is computed
in step 7(c)ii. Therefore CM ⊆ CD thus we have that PA∪H∪(CP∩CU)∪{c← not cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CU)}∪
CM |= r. However, since CM ⊆ CD this implies that PA∪H∪(CP∩CU )∪{c← not cˆ | c ∈ (CP ∪ CU )}∪
CM |= c for all c ∈ CP because cˆ is a new symbol not occurring in PA and H. Therefore, PA ∪H∪
CP ∪ CM |= r and PA ∪H ∪ CP ∪ CM |= ⊥ which contradicts with the assumption in step 7b that
no such set CM exists.
Theorem 9.1 (Soundness) Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a request.
If a client gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 9 then he has a solution set CS that unlocks r
according to PA.
Proof. This proof is rather straightforward. Let suppose that the client, requested service
r, got grant. The only way to get it is when PA ∪ H ∪ CP |= r. Then there are two cases: either
CP = ∅ or CP = ∅.
If CP = ∅ then the resource r is not protected by PA or must be executed by conditions related
to H. In both cases PA ∪H |= r. So, the ∅ is a solution for r and the client has it.
If CP = ∅ then the only way to introduce a credential in CP is by step 2 of the algorithm.
Since initially CP = ∅ so the client has sent a sequence of sets of credentials Cp1, . . . , Cpn such that⋃n
i=1 Cp i = CP . Then the client has a set of credentials that unlocks it.
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Theorem 9.2 (Termination) Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy and r a
request. The access control algorithm in Figure 9 always terminates.
Proof. The algorithm terminates when either grant or deny is returned back.
We will prove the termination by well-founded tuple ordering. At each interaction we associate
a tuple <C1,. . . ,Cn> of credentials and stipulate that <C1,. . . ,Cn>≺<C′1,. . . ,C
′
n> if either C1 ⊂ C
′
1
or for some i < n C1 = C′1, C2 = C
′
2, . . . , Ci = C
′
i and Ci+1 ⊂ C
′
i+1.
This is a well-founded ordering which has as a top element the tuple with all credentials occurring
in the policies. We associate the tuple <CN , CU , CP ∪ CR> to each interaction. At the end of the
interaction, which does not return grant or deny, we have already proved by Lemma 9.1 that CM = ∅
or CE = ∅. At the next interaction we have also received Cp and Cr . We use <CN , CU , CP ∪ CR>
to denote the previous interaction and the primed version for the values at the end of the current
interaction.
If CM \ Cp = ∅ then CN = CN ∪ (CM \ Cp) is strictly increasing and thus <CN , CU , CP ∪
CR>≺<CN ∪ (CM \ Cp), CU ′ , CP ′ ∪ CR′> and we are done.
if CM \ Cp = ∅ and CE \ Cr = ∅ then CN = CN ∪ (CM \ Cp) is unchanged but CU = CU ∪ (CE \ Cr )
is strictly increasing and thus <CN , CU , CP ∪ CR>≺<CN ∪ (CM \ Cp), CU ∪ (CE \ Cr ), CP ′ ∪ CR′>
and we are done.
Let us now consider the case CM \ Cp = ∅ and CE \ Cr = ∅. If Cr = CE and CM = Cp then by
construction the algorithm returns grant. So, we must be in a situation where Cr ⊃ CE or Cp ⊃ CM,
i.e. we have either given something we have not been asked or revoked something we have not been
asked to revoke.
Since CN and CU remain unchanged therefore we have to prove that CP ∪CR ⊂ CP ′ ∪CR′ where
according to Figure 9 we have
(1) CR′ = (CR \ CM) ∪ (Cr ∩ CE)
(2) CP ′ = (CP \ CR′) ∪ (Cp \ CR′) ∪ (Cp ∩ CM) ∪ (Cp ∩ CN )
To prove it ﬁrst we will show that ∀c ∈ CP ∪ CR : c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′ and second that ∃c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′ :
c ∈ CP ∪ CR.
To prove that ∀c ∈ CP∪CR : c ∈ CP ′∪CR′ let us assume the converse ∃c ∈ CP∪CR : c ∈ CP ′∪CR′
and we will show that it contradicts with some facts. Let c ∈ CP then since c ∈ CP ′ follows that
according to step (2) c ∈ CR′ but then c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′ which is contradiction.
Let c ∈ CP and c ∈ CR. Since c ∈ CR′ and by step (1) follows that c ∈ CR \ CM so c ∈ CM.
Since Cp ⊃ CM so c ∈ Cp ∩ CM and then from step (2) follows that c ∈ CP ′ . Thus c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′
which is again contradiction.
We have just proved that ∀c ∈ CP ∪ CR : c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′ .
Let us now resume the conditions we have. We are in a case Cp ⊃ CM or Cr ⊃ CE where either
Cp ⊇ CM or Cr ⊇ CE .
To prove the second part that ∃c ∈ CP ′ ∪ CR′ : c ∈ CP ∪ CR we will divide it in the following
cases and prove each of them respectively:
1. if Cr = CE and Cp \ CM ⊆ CR then we know that ∀c ∈ Cp \ CM and step (2) follows that
c ∈ CP ′ and thus the algorithm returns grant.
This case describes the situation where a client presents as additional credentials some of
those already revoked by him and so the system will not consider them when taking an access
decision (they do not change CP).
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2. if Cr = CE and (Cp \ CM) \ CR ⊆ CP then we still get grant as ∀c ∈ (Cp \ CM) \ CR holds
that c ∈ CR′ (ref. step (1)) and following that we get c ∈ CP ′ (ref. step (2)), but it was still
previously consistent with the policy and so the algorithm returns grant.
Here we extend case 1 and reason for those credentials, additionally presented by the client,
that have already been activated by him. In this case these credentials do not inﬂuence on
the access decision since they do not change CP .
3. if Cr = CE and Cp \ CM ⊆ CP ∪ CR then ∃c ∈ Cp \ CM : c ∈ CP ∪ CR then according to step
(1) and assumption that Cp ∩ Cr = ∅ follows that c ∈ CR′ and so in step (2) this credential is
added to CP ′ . Therefore it holds that CP ′ ∪ CR′ ⊃ CP ∪ CR.
4. if Cr ⊃ CE then ∀c ∈ Cr \ CE follows that
• if c ∈ CR \ CM then c ∈ CR′ and so it does not change CP ′ and thus the proof follows
from the previous cases 1, 2 and 3 with Cr = CE .
• if c ∈ CR \ CM then it will also not change CR′ and CP ′ from the previous interaction
and we can go to the previous cases 1, 2 and 3 with Cr = CE .
So, we proved that in an interaction process a client either increases the set of declined creden-
tials CN or, if it remains unchanged, he increases the set of not revoked credentials CU or, if both of
them remain unchanged, the client increases his sets of total credentials8 submitted to the system.
The process continues until the client exhausts all credentials occurring in the access policy.
With this we ﬁnish the proof.
9.5 Completeness for Powerful and Cooperative Clients
Theorem 9.3 (Completeness for a Monotonic Access Policy) Let PA be a monotonic ac-
cess policy, PD be a monotonic disclosure policy and r a request. If PA and PD guarantee fair access
and interaction then a powerful or cooperative client (as deﬁned in §.8.1 of the basic framework)
always gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 9.
Proof. Essentially along the lines of the algorithm in Figure 6.
Of course the whole business of stateful systems requires non-monotonic policies, so this result
is not enough. Here we relax the policy access PA from the assumption of monotonic policy and
consider it as an arbitrary non-monotonic policy. So, from now on we assume that PA is non-
monotonic and PD monotonic unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise.
In the same context, we inherit and extend the assumption from the basic framework so that,
now, whenever a client initially requests a service he submits Cp = Cr = ∅ and if hidden credentials
CH needed then Cp = CH and Cr = ∅.
Here one can doubt why we do not relieve the assumption of arbitrary sets of initially presented
and revoked credentials. Anyway it will not inﬂuence on the proofs since whatever is in the initial
sets Cp and Cr we can add Cp to CP and drop Cr from CP and restart the proof with the new set
CP assuming that the client initially presents Cp = Cr = ∅.
8Credentials that are either revoked or active.
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Theorem 9.4 (Completeness for a Powerful and Compliant Client) Let PA be an access
policy, PD be a disclosure policy, H be history of executions and r a request. If PA ∪ H9 and PD
guarantee fair access and interaction then a powerful and compliant client always gets grant r with
the algorithm in Figure 9.
Proof. Let us have a powerful client that requests r with an initial set of presented and
revoked credentials equal to an empty set, namely Cp = Cr = ∅. Also we assume that the set of
active credentials is a non-empty set containing credentials that the client has submitted in previous
interactions with services within the same partner’s domain, CP = ∅.
So, keeping the assumption of the initial empty sets, steps 1 to 5 compute
Cp = Cr = CR = CN = CU = CM = CE = ∅. If the check in step 6 succeeds then in step 7 the
algorithm returns grant (either no credentials are needed for r or the client already has a solution
in CP for r) and we are done.
If step 6 does not succeed then the algorithm goes to step 7a. Then using the assumption
of fair access and interaction follows that a solution CS for r exists, it is disclosable by PD and
(CS \ CP) ⊆ CD.
Now that we are sure of existence of a solution for r there are two cases:
• Step 7b ﬁnds a missing set CM and so <ask(CM), revoke(CE)> is sent back to the client.
In this case CE = ∅.
Then on the next interaction step, since the client is a powerful one, he presents all c ∈ CM.
After the updates, in step 6, since CP = CP ∪ CM then the check succeeds and in the next
step 7 the algorithm returns grant r.
• Step 7b does not ﬁnd a missing set CM. In this case, since at least one solution CS exists
in CD, follows that in CP there are “wrong” credentials that ban the client to get a solution,
namely CP \ CS = ∅. So, the algorithm goes to step 7(c)ii. At this step the abduction
reasoning does compute a missing set CM simply because, at least, one such exists and is CM =
{cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CS)} ∪ (CS \ CP) such that CM ⊆ {cˆ | c ∈ CP} ∪ CD and CE = {c | cˆ ∈ CM} = ∅
conforming to Lemma 9.1. We have the set diﬀerence of CP \ CS and CS \ CP just to assure
that we do not ask the client to revoke and, at the same time, activate any credentials from
the solution CS .
Here PA∪H∪{c← not cˆ. | c ∈ CP}∪CM is equivalent to PA∪H∪CS . Since CS is a solution
for r follows that abduction ﬁnds at least this missing set and step 7(c)iii is skipped. Then in
step 7(c)iiiA the new CE and CM are computed. We remark that the just computed two sets
replaced back in the equations of step 7(c)ii transform them into PA∪H∪ (CP \CE )∪CM |= r
and |= ⊥.
Then after the result <ask(CM),revoke(CE)> is returned back to the client, since he is pow-
erful, he activates all missing and revokes all excessing credentials. On the next interaction, in
step 6, since CP is updated to CP = (CP \ CE)∪ CM follows that the deduction check succeeds
and in step 7 the algorithm returns grant r.
We note that the algorithm grants a powerful client in no more than two interactions. With this
we ﬁnish the proof.
9It is important to pose the property of fair access over PA∪H because it guarantees fairness wrt other (possibly)
environment constraints like limited number of executions on a service, limited number of users accessing a service,
etc.
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Theorem 9.5 (Completeness for a Cooperative and Compliant Client) Let PA be an
access policy, PD be a disclosure policy, H be history of executions and r a request. If PA ∪H and
PD guarantee fair access and interaction then if a cooperative and compliant client has a set of
credentials CS that unlocks r according to PA then the client always gets grant r with the algorithm
in Figure 9.
Proof. We will prove the theorem in two parts. First part by induction, showing that in a
single interaction if a cooperative client does not get grant r then he gets <ask(CM), revoke(CE)>.
In other words he will never receive denial of the algorithm. Second part, we will show that because
of the ﬁrst part and Theorem 9.2 for termination a cooperative client with a solution set CS always
gets grant r.
Part I Proof by induction on the interaction steps:
Inter. 1: A cooperative client requests r with initial sets Cp = Cr = ∅. Since the client has a
solution CS for r and because of fair access and interaction properties so at least one solution
exists and is disclosable by PD, i.e. (CS \ CP) ⊆ CD.
Let assume that the client does not get grant r in step 7 of the algorithm and that abduction
in step 7b cannot ﬁnd a missing set CM. Then the step 7(c)iii of denial is skipped because
at least one solution exists, which is CM = {cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CS)} ∪ (CS \ CP). This solution
satisﬁes the conditions in step 7(c)ii and can be checked in the same way as in the Theorem
9.4. After that steps 7(c)iiiA and 7(c)iiiB compute and return back to the client <ask(CM),
revoke(CE)>.
Inter. N: Here we use the abduction hypothesis that the client fails to get grant r and gets
<ask(CM), revoke(CE)> in the previous interaction. Now, suppose that the client fails to get
grant r in step 7 and in step 7b the abduction reasoning fails to ﬁnd a missing set.
So, up to now in the client’s set of CP there are “wrong” credentials that ban the client to get
a missing set (solution) for r. Since the client has a solution CS for r and because of fair access
and interaction properties so this solution is disclosable by PD. Here is also the point where
we use the fact that PD is a monotonic policy. It is because in the set of active credentials
CP we have credentials partially compiled from requests for other solutions for r which the
client does not have. And so if the policy PD is non-monotonic we cannot guarantee that the
solution CS is always disclosable (in the presence of other credentials).
Again a missing set CM = {cˆ | c ∈ (CP \ CS)}∪ (CS \CP ) exists which analogously of Theorem
9.4 can be checked that it satisﬁes the conditions in step 7(c)ii and so denial is skipped. We
only point out that since the client is cooperative then the sets CU and CN will never overlap
with the credentials the client has presented to the system, i.e. CU ∩CP = ∅ and CN ∩CP = ∅.
And so the result <ask(CM), revoke(CE)> in step 7(c)iiiB is returned back to the client.
Part II What we have so far:
• If the client does not get grant he gets <ask(CM), revoke(CE)> (just proved in Part I),
• The client is never idle, i.e. never gets <ask(∅), revoke(∅)> (follows from Lemma 9.1),
• The algorithm at certain interaction always returns grant or deny (Theorem 9.2),
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According to the three cases above follows that the client in a ﬁnite number of interactions will get
grant r.
Theorem 9.6 (Completeness for a Powerful Client with Hidden Credentials) Let PA be
an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy, H be history of executions and r a request. If PA ∪H
and PD guarantee fair access and interaction then a powerful client with hidden credentials CH for
r always gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 9.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is analogously of that for Theorem 9.4. The only diﬀerence
is that initially the client presents the set of hidden credentials CH that helps him to disclose the
visible part of a solution CS from PD, i.e. ∀c ∈ CS \ CH : PD ∪H |= c (ref. Deﬁnitions 8.3 and 8.5).
And so in step 7b because of fair access and interaction properties follows that CS ⊆ (CP ∪CD) and
the abduction reasoning potentially can ﬁnd a missing set CM.
The rest of the proof follows (can be done along the same line) from Theorem 9.4. With this
we ﬁnish the proof.
Theorem 9.7 (Completeness for a Cooperative and Compliant Client with Hidden
Credentials) Let PA be an access policy, PD be a disclosure policy, H be history of executions
and r a request. If PA ∪H and PD guarantee fair access and interaction then if a cooperative and
compliant client with hidden credentials CH for r has a solution set CS for CH then the client always
gets grant r with the algorithm in Figure 9.
Proof. Let us start from the fact that the client has a set of hidden credentials CH for r
and the same has a solution set CS wrt CH. It means that ﬁrst according to Deﬁnition 8.3 the set
CH ⊆ CS – important step assuring that the client has the right set of hidden credentials especially
for the solution CS . Second, according to Deﬁnition 8.5 the solution set CS is disclosable by PD
and CH.
Then using the assumption on the client with hidden credentials, that whenever he requests a
service he initially presents the hidden credentials, we can construct the same proof along the one
for Theorem 9.5. The only diﬀerence is that since the hidden credentials are submitted initially
so at least the solution CS is disclosable by PD and using fair access and interaction properties we
always return <ask(CM), revoke(CE )> until the client discloses the entire CS .
With this we ﬁnish the proof.
10 Related Work
As we mentioned in the introduction, access control for autonomic communication borrows some
aspect of trust management and some aspects of workﬂow security. Among these models we ﬁnd a
number of relevant works: for workﬂows [4], web services [32], role-based access control on the web
[14, 33], tasks [16] and DRM [32], possibly coupled by sophisticated policy combination algorithms.
However, they have mostly remained within the classical framework – all decisions of grant/deny
are based on checking that request would follow from the policy and the presented set of credentials.
The work on trust negotiation [34] focuses on communication and infrastructure and assumes
that requests and counter requests have been somehow calculated from the access policy. Also the
formal models on credential-based access control and policy combination [4, 27, 15, 39] do not treat
the problem of inferring missing credentials from failed requests. Also standardization eﬀort like
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XACML proposal [40] gives rules for deriving what is right (evaluating policies) and not rules for
understanding what went wrong.
Also a recent proposal by Bonatti and Samarati [5] that has the explicit focus on access and
release control is not fully on target. In a nutshell, the request is received, the policy rules are
ﬁltered for relevance, the relevant rules are partially evaluated and sent to the client. The client
will have to ﬁgure out which are the credentials and then will evaluate these credentials according
to its release policy.
The ﬁrst problem is that demanding clients to analyze security policies is not acceptable here.
The second problem is that after a suitable number of queries the entire policy of the server would
be disclosed to the client. Here we only disclose the needed credentials and not the rules of the
policy whose structure remains hidden to the client. Furthermore, the relevancy ﬁltering approach
only works for ﬂat (monotone) policies, in which for every request we list all of its credentials.
The other key proposal on trust negotiation by Yu et al. [42], oﬀers a dual view w.r.t Bonatti
and Samarati [5]. Loosely speaking, each credential is associated to a policy (a boolean expression)
denoting the credentials that a client must have already provided for its safe disclosure. By a
step wise process the parties can exchange credentials or policy rules until the desired resource is
released. The paper provides safe sequences of disclosure in a rather ad-hoc fashion building upon
trees rather than logical formalization. As a consequence they can only treat monotone policies and
it is not possible to deﬁne notions of consistency of policies and disclosure of policies in presence of
constraints (e.g. separation of duty). Another limitation of the paper is that it interlocks the access
and the release policy into one. So, as the authors acknowledge [42, page. 21], it is impossible to
access resources if some of the needed credentials cannot be disclosed at some point. Furthermore,
the need for intermediate credential disclosure calls for a structuring of policy rules that may be
counter-intuitive from the point of view of access control. For instance, a policy rule may say that
for access to the full text of an on-line journal article we must have already got access to browsing
the journal’s table of contents, plus additional credentials. Access to the table of contents could
then specify some simpler set of credentials. For the disclosure process to take place such natural
composition is not possible when using Yu et al. framework [42].
Another proposal by Yu and Winslett [41] postulates that policies for protecting resources
should be themselves treated (protected) as ﬁrst class sensitive resources. The authors distinguish
between policy disclosure and policy satisfaction which allows them to have control on when a
policy can be disclosed from when a policy is satisﬁed.
However, Yu and Winslett policies determine whether a client is authorized to be informed of
the need to satisfy a given policy. While, in our case, having a separate disclosure policy PD allows
us to have a ﬁner-grained disclosure control over the information ﬂow back to a client. Instead
of controlling the disclosure of (entire) policies as a ﬁnest-grained unit, we are able to control
the disclosure of credentials/requirements, which compose single individual policies, separately and
independently from the disclosure of the policies themselves. In this case we are able to say whether
a client is allowed to know for the need of any element (credential), part of a given policy, and if it
is allowed then the disclosure process takes place.
11 Conclusions
In this work we proposed a framework for policy-based self-managed access control in autonomic
communication. The framework is grounded in a formal model based on Datalog with the stable
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model semantics. The key idea is that in an autonomic network a client may have the right
credentials but may not know them and thus an autonomic communication server needs a way to
avoid leaving the client stranded.
We have proposed a solution to this problem by extending classical policy-based access control
models with an advanced reasoning service: abduction. Building on top of this service, we have pre-
sented the key interactive access control algorithm that computes on the ﬂy the missing credentials
needed for a client to get access. We extended the algorithm to cope with arbitrary access policies
so that in cases of inconsistency it performs a recovery step and ﬁnds a set of excessing credentials
banning the client to get a solution for the desired resource. Following that a strengthened version
of the algorithm is presented that is resistant to DoS attacks. We have then proved that for coop-
erative and compliant clients the access control framework is complete, i.e. a client with the right
credentials can always get access.
We also enriched the framework over the existing policy-based approaches for access control by
introducing the diﬀerence between disclosable and hidden credentials and between monotonic and
well-behaved policies. The ﬁrst distinction addresses the behavior of an autonomic node allowing
it to dynamically protect the privacy of his policies by specifying which credentials are hidden and
which are not. This allows a server to restrict access to certain services only to selected clients.
The latter distinction extends our work on a wider set of policy languages wrt the already existing
approaches [5, 42, 28].
One of the advantages in our approach is that we do not pose any restrictions on partner’s
policies since the basic computations we perform on the policies are deduction and abduction,
which do not require any speciﬁc policy structure.
Future work is in the direction of characterizing the complexity of the framweork10, extend-
ing it to cope with mutual negotiation, and fully integrate our implementation with a privilege
management infrastructure (PMI).
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